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rITE activity ofmost financial market participants
on Friday afternoons can be predicted with great
accuracy: they anxiously willhe awaitimmg the 4:15p.m.
EST ammnouucement of the new weekly money stock
data. Despite the fact that the weekly data are con-
taminated by a greatdeal of “noise,” a fact that greatly
reduces the data’s usefulness imm revealing any policy
trend, market participants still wager large sums and
reputations on correctly anticipatingthe eltisiveweek-
ly money figure.’
The impact ofunanticipated changes in the weekly
money supply on short-term interest rates has been
investigated extensively. In general, the evidence
shows a positive relationship between unanticipated
changes in money and movements in market rates.2
Although this empirical relationship existed through-
tm
See David A. Pierce, Trend amid Noise imm the ~ionetary Aggre-
gates,’ in Federal Reserve Staff Study New Monetary Control
Procedures, vol. II (February 1981), especially pp. 19—22. Piemee
estim,mates that the noise imm weekly money data is around 83 billion
dollars, assuming an aggregate level of$400 hiliion. As he notes,
‘to general, these results are further evidence that very little can
Ime inferred from any hut the most atypical movemiments in weekly
data” (p. 22).
‘See, for example, Jacob Crossmnamm, ‘The ‘Batiommality’ of Money
Supply Expcctatiomms and the Short—Rumm Respommse ofInterestRates
to Mommctan’ Surprises,” Journal of’Money, Credit and Banking
(Novenmber 1981), pp. 409—24: V. Vance Roley, “The Response of
Short—Termn Immtemost Rates to Weekly Mommey Ammmmoumicements,”
Working Paper No. 82-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
(September 1982); Thomas Urieh, ‘The information Commtcmmt of
Weekly Money Supply Anmmoummcemmments,’’ Jonma! of Monetary
Economics (July 1982), pp. 73-88; ammd Thonmas J. Uriclm and Paul
Wachtei, ‘‘Market Response to the Weekly Mommey Supply
Ammmmoummcemermts in time 1970s, “ Journal of Finance (Decemmmber
1981), pp. 1063—72. For ammother immterpretatiomm, see Bradford Cor-
mmell, ‘Mommev Supply ,Ammnouneemmsemmts ammd Immterest Rates: Anotimer
View,’’Journal of Business )Jamsmsarv 1983), pp. 1—23,
out the 1970s, the relative impact of weekly mnoney
“surprises” on short-term interestrates has beengreat-
er since the October 1979 change in monetary control
procedures. In fact, over 25 percent ofthe volatility of
the 3-month Treasury bill rate during the time period
of the money supply announcement can be attributed
directly to the increased volatility of unanticipated
weekly changes in money since October 1979.~
Noreover, unanticipated money supply changes that
lie outside the Federal Reserve’s announced money
growth range appear to have a relatively greater effect
on interest rates than money surprises falling within
the announced growth range.4
The evidence clearly indicates that unanticipated
changes in the money stock have animportanteffect on
interestrates. Consequently, examining the character-
istics of the mommey supply forecasts that give rise to
such behavior is important. Several studies have ex-
amined the weekly money supply forecasts for the
period prior to October 1979; hnt little has been done
on comparing the forecasts across the announced
change in monetary control procedures.°The purpose
of this article is to analyze the effects of the October
3
Rolev, “The Response of Slmort—Tcrnm Immterest Rates,’’
tm
ibid, See also, Neil C. Berknian, “0mm the Significanceof Weekly
Chammges imm Ml,’’ New England Economic Review (May—June
1978), pp. 5—22.
5
Stmmdios immvestigatingthe forecastsprior to time October 1979 policy
slmift are Crossman. “TIme Rationality’ of Mommey Supply Expecta-
lions, ammd Thomas Urieh and Paul \Vaehtel, “The Structure of
Expeetatiomms oftime WeeklyMoney Supply Anmmouneemnent,’’(New
York Ummiversity, F’ehruarv 1982: processed). Role’, “rime Re-
spouse of Slmom’t—’fermn lmmterest Rates,” provides sommme evidence 0mm
this issue for time pem’iod Feimrmmarv 1980 to Novemher 1981.
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1979 clmammge in monetary commtroi 0mm time weekly money time change in motmetarv commtrol procedures affected
supply forecasts. Under the assumption ofrational ex-
pectations, a change fromn one recognized monetary
control procedum-e to another should have mmo effect 0mm
the forecast characteristics.6 In other words, a change
from one monetary control procedure to another
should notaffect the unbiased and efficiencyaspects of
the forecasts. IE however, the new procedure is not
“well-defined” — that is, the rules of the gamne are
changing constantly — then weekly money supply
forecasts may appear biased and inefficient.’
5%]IAT DO.ES “RATIONALITY” 15IPLY?
The theory of rational expectations is based on the
premise that market participants construct forecasts of
the futtire in a manner that fully reflects the relevant
information available to them. Because wealth-maxi-
mizing individuals will not make forecasts that are
continually wrong in the same direction, the rational
expectations approach suggests that forecasts of eco-
nomic phenomena should be unbiased. Moreover, if
the forecast errors could uot have been reduced by
using other available information, then forecasters
have efficiently utilized the relevant data at their dis-
posal
the unbiased and efficiency characteristicsof timeweek-
ly money supply forecasts? If time fbrccasts from time
post-October 1979 period are not dilferent thaim those
fromn before, we timeim would conchmde timat tile fore-
casters have adapted to the new policy regime. If they
differ, however, the evidence would not reject the
hypothesis that they have been unable to ascertain the
polic~maker’sbehavioral rule.8
Three sample periods are used in time followinganal-
ysis. The full period is from the week ending January
11, 1978, totheweekeudingJune 16,1982. Giventhe
change in operating procedures in late 1979, the rele-
vant subperiods arefrom theweek ending January 11,
1978, to the week ending October 3, 1979, and from
theweek endingOctober 10, 1979, to theweek ending
June 16, 1982.°With these sample periods, the un-
biased and efficiency characteristics of the weekly
money snppiy forecasts across the change in monetary
control procedures can be investigated.
Weekly Mon.eq Supply Data
The nmoney data series used in this article are the
actual and expected, initially announced week-to-
The issue investigated here is whether the weekly
forecasts of the Ml money stock change have been
affected noticeably by the October 1979 change in
monetary control procedures. More specifically, the
question asked is: assuming rational expectations, has
(trhe concept of rational expectations is based on the belief that
ee0000mic agents are utility maximizers. hums, mnarket participammts
form expectations that fully reflect all available immfonmuation, More
formally, rational expectations imnply that individuals’ subjective
probability distribution of possible outcomes is identical to the
objective probability- distm’ibmitiomms that actually occur. Commse—
(lmiemitlY, the ommiy way policymakers can afl~etbehavior is to “fool”
the people in an immeonsistent manner. This eommcept is developed
more fully’ immJohn F, Muth, “Ratiommal Expectatiomms amid the Theory
of Price Movements,’ Econometrica (Jmily 1961), pp. 315—35;
Robert E. Lucas, Jr. “Expectations and time Neutrality of Money.”
journal of Ecotmosnic Theory (April 1972), pp. 103—24; Robert J.
Barmo, “Rational Expectations and the Role of Monetary Policy,
Journal of Monetary Economics (January 1976), pp. 1—32; amid
Thomnas J. Sargemit amid Neil Wallace, “Rational Expectatiomms, time
Optimmmal Monetary lnstrsssnent, and time Optimmmal Mommcy Supply
Rule,” Jomimnal of Political Economy (April 1975), pp. 241—51.
T
lmplieit in tlmis is time presumption that mnam’ket participammts will
expend resomim’ces to decipher time miewpohey procedures ammd adapt
their forecast formation process accordingly. This does miot sceni
unreasommable given time sopimistication of financial msmarkct ammalysts
in gauging actual F’ccleral Reserve beimavior. For a diseussiomm (in
the transition from omie policy to another amid time nnplieatiomms for
rational expectations, see Bemmjamnin Xl - Friedman, “Optimimal Ex—
peetations and time Extreme Imiformatioim Assumptions of‘Rational
Expectations Macronmodels, “ Journal of Monetary Economics
(January 1979), pp. 23—41.
‘trhe dilemma facing market participants is known as the ‘Lucas
problem Essentially, even though individsals act rationally in
making their forecasts -..—that is, use all of time information thought
to herelevant — failure toaccount for aprocedural shift will lead to
incorrect forecasts. Timns, forecasting guidelines used under one
procedure mmmay not apply under another, For the specific problem
tested here, it nmay be the case that the annonmmced policy differs
From that actually followed. Ifpolicy actions are mmot characterized
easily, that is, ifpolicy is smnpredictable, then forecasts may be
biased amid inefficient simply because agents Imave mmot deternmined
the strmmctmmre of the model. For a discussion of this concept, see
Robert F. I~uc4s. Jr., ‘‘Ecomiometrie Policy Evaluation: A Cri-
tique, imm Karl Brunner and Allamm H. Meit-xer, eds., TIme Phillips
Curve and Labor Markets, Time Carnegie-Rochester Commforemmcc
Series omm Pmihhc Policy (voi, 1, 1976), pp. i9—46.
Bradford Cornell recently’ has argued that apparemmt irratiommal
behavior on time part of mnarket participants evidenced by biased
ammd immefficient forecasts, mnay yen well be doe to time changefroni a
predictable policy regime to one that comitinoes to lie ummpredict—
able. As he states, “On October 6 [1979], mnarket pam’ticipammts
suddenly rliscovered that cvemm time roles of tIme gammic were smmbject
to change. As a result, they begamm studying weekly mnommcy snpplv
figures not ommiy- with the goal of dcterminimmg “hat time current
policy was, bmit also witim tIme goalof determnimming how tIme rulesof
the gamne might ime chammged. “ In this semmsc, niarket participammts
face a perpctnal “Lucas problemu. ‘ See Cornell, ‘Momiev Supply
Annonncemcmmts and immtcrest Rates: Amsotimcr View,” p. 21.
‘Note that time post-October 1979 period imicludes the period of
credit controls, essentially time sceomid qmmarter of1980. This period
is imseludedbecammsc aim examnimmation of tIme erm-or pattern from week-
ly- moneylorecasts immdicated no differemmee bctweemm this period amid
any- other, Moreover, mmiarket participants comitimined to forecast
weekly muoney chammges tbrommgbormt tIme coimtrol period.
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week changes in the narrowly defined money stock
(Ml). Figures for the actual changes in Ml are taken
from the Federal Reserve’s 1-1.6 weekly statistical re-
lease, Because the sample covers a period ofchanging
definitions, the following guideline is used: From
January 11, 1978, to January 31, 1980, the weekly
money supply changes are based on the oid definition
ofMl, From February 8, 1980, toNovember 20, 1981,
the money stock is definedas the actual M1B mneasnre,
not the M1B figurethat was adjusted for NOW account
movemiments. Finally, frommm Novemmmher27, 1981, to June
16, 1982, the data arebased onthe then-current defini-
tion of Ml.
The data used as a mmmeasure ofthe market’s forecasts
were obtained from Money Market Services, Inc.’0
Since 1977 this firm has conducted a weeklytelephone
survey of50 to 60 government securitiesdealers to get
their expectations ofthe impending change in rnommey.
Prior to early 1980, the poH was conducted twice a
week, onTuesdays and Thursdays. Since then, howev-
er, only the Thursday survey has been conducted con-
sistently, because of the shift in the Federal Reserve’s
announcement of the weekly money supply figures
from Thursday to Friday afternoon. For our purposes,
therefore, weempioy the mean ofthe Thursday stirvey
responses. mm
Are •%iveekly I.4oneq Fareeasts- 1.-Abler-ed?
Forecasts of weeklychanges in time money stock are
unbiased predictors of the actual change ifthe actual
and forecasted values differ only by some random
term. Mathematically, this requiremmmeut can be stated
as
(1) ~ = ~~1AM~ + e~
where AM~is the actual change in the money stock,
~ 1SM~”is the expectation held in period t-1 for the
change in the money stock in period t, and Em 15 a
random error term with zero mean and variance o’~.
To test for the absence ofbias, equation 1 is rewrit-
ten and estimated as
(2) ~ = a0
+ Pm _1~M~’ + g~
where a0 and Pm are the parameters to be estimated. ma
In this form, the weekly money forecasts are tmnbiased
predictors of actual money supply changes if thejoint
hypothesis that &ç~= 0 and 13m = 1 cannot be rejected.
Moreover, the estimated residuals frommm this regression
(~~) should not exhibit serial correlation ifthe forecasts
are unbiased predictions of the actual change in
money.
Table 1 presents the regression results from estimat-
ing equation 2 using the expected and actual money
stock changes. The full-period results suggest that the
forecasts of weekly changes in the money stock are
unbiased predictors of the actual chamiges. The calcu-
iated F-statistic does not exceed the criticai value of
3,04 at the 5 percent significance level. Consequently,
the nulljoint hypothesis that &o = 0 and Pm = 1 is not
rejected. Moreover, the residualsofthe equationshow
no indication of first-order serial correlation, as evi-
denced by the Dnrbin-Watson statistic. Thus, the
weekly money supply forecasts appear to be unbiased
across the ftmil sample,
To see ifthe forecasts are unbiased before and after
the October 1979 change in monetary control proce-
dures, equatiomm 2 was re-estimated for the two periods
January11, 1978, to October 3, 1979, and October 10,
1979, to June 16, 1982, These regression results also
are reported in table 1. i3
The estimates from the pre-October 1979 period
again indicate that the forecasts are unbiased. The
calcuiated F-statistic is not statistically significant, and
the Durbin-Watson statistic again indicates no first-
order seriai correlation amommg the residuals. In con-
trast, the post-October 1979 regression results permit
us to reject the hypothesis that the forecasts are un-
biased predictors of the actuai changes. Although the
estimated constant term is statistically insignificant,
the hypothesis that the estimated slope term (Pm) does
not differ from unity is rejected easiiy (t = 2,33),
Conseqtientiy, the joint hypothesis underlying this
501t has been argued that survey data are not good measures ofthe
market’s expectationsofsomuemacroeconomic vam-iahle. This argu-
ument is Foonded on the belief that most sun-ey m-espondents are
not actual mnarket partieipammts. 1mmother words, theirresponses to
thesurvey are not based on someproflt-maxinuzing behavior timat
has generated the forecast, The weekly mnoneyforecastsused here
are taken from dealers actively partieipatimig in the financial mar-
ket, thns reducing theforce ofthis criticisos, See Edward J, Kamme
and Burton C. Malkiel, “Autoregressive and Nonaotoregressive
Elements in Cross-Sectiomm Forecasts ofInflation,” Econometrica
(January 1976), pp. 1—16.
ilFor an analysis ofthe Tuesday amid Tlmursday forecasts, see Cross-
nsami, “Time ‘Rationality’ of Money Smmppl~ Expectations” This
analysis covers only the period 1977 to 1979.
‘
tm
Thistype oftest is usedwidely imm studies ofexpectations data. For
studies examnimming moneystockforecasts, see, forexample, Cross-
muan, “The ‘Rationality’ of Money Supply Expectations;” Uricis
and Waehtell, “The Structure ofExpectations;” and Roley, “Time
Response oFShort-Termn Interest Rates-”
ma~1-h~S diehotomizatiomm of the sample is supported statistically by
Chow-test results: the calculated F-value is F(2,228) 3.93,
which exceeds the critical 5 percent level,
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where ltmt and p~are random error terms. In this
format, weak-formefficiency requires that Pt
= j3~ for
all i; i = 1, 2
To determine if survey respondents efficiently uti-
lized time information contained in pastweekly mmmoney
supplychanges, equation 4 is subtracted fromequation
3, yielding the estimated equation
n
(5) iXM~— m_mt~M~ = h0
+ ~ h~/SM~+ ~
where the dependent variable ~ — t - ~ repre-
sents the forecasters’ errors in predicting weekly
money changes, and the independent variables,
are the actual changes in money.’6 The equa-
tion permnits a constant term (b0) to be estimated in-
stead ofstmbsmiming it into the error structure, which is
represented by the term ~ (= ~
1
t~— ~). The null
hypothesis to be tested is thatthe estimated b~ ( = p —
mafiaform ofthe efficiency test was proposed in James E, Pesando,
“A Note ou the Rationality of the Livingston Price Expeetatiomis
Data,’ Journal ofPolitical Economy (August 1975), pp. 849—58,
‘°The lagged values of data used in the efficiency test are the
course, additional information will he acquired only if the one-week revised numbers, not the initially reported weekly
marginal benefits are at least as large as time marginal costs of figures. Since time revised figures contain umore iuformnation than
acquisition. Auseful discussion ofthis poimmt is provided in Armen the originaliy released data — the data contained in the revision
A,Alchiau, “Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unem- itself — using original data would deprive forecasters of some
ployment,” in Edmummd S. Phelps, and others, Microeconornic inforumatiou, It should he noted, however, that the conclusions
Foundation.s ofEmployment and Inflation Tlmeory (Xv. xv. Norton reachedwere not affected when originally reported data was used
& Compammy, Inc., 1970), pp. 27—52. to generate lagged changes iu the momiey stock.
test also is rejected; the calculated F-statistic of3.70
exceeds the 5percent critical value of3.07, Thus, the
evidence suggests that forecasts of weekly money
supply changes have been biased since the October
1979 change in implementing monetary policy,
Are SLeekly Money Foreearls Fffi.eient?
Theefficiency condition requires that forecasts fully
reflect all pertinent and readily available informa-
tion. “ Since the information available to individuals
includes the past history ofthe series beingforecast, it
is possible to test the hypothesis that the forecasts are
“weakly” efficient; that is, at least the information con-
tained in the history ofweekly money supply changes
is used efficiently. This concept ofefficiency requires
that the process actually generating observed changes
in weekly money and the process generating the fore-
casts of these chammges are the same. The simplest
process to assume is an autoregressive one, where
observed and expected changes are generated solely
by the past history ofthe series itself. Mathematically,
this concept ofefficiency can he stated as
n
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are imot statistically difkremmt from zero for all i (i =
1, 2,.,., n) as a group. Moreover, the estinmated error
structure slmould not eximibit serial correlation. ~
Table 2presents time results ofestinmating equation 5
for the period January tI, 1978, to June 16. 1982, Four
lags were chosen to capture time informational commtemmt
of past chammges imm weekly mnonev, The regression re-
sults immchcate that past changes inthe nmoimev suppl~’ do
mmot explaiim any’sigmmificant portiomm of time forecast error.
The calculated F—statistic (0.81)is far below acceptable
critical values. Time Durbin—V~atsommstatistic also indi-
cates timat serial correlation is not present among the
residuals. Thus. for the full period, we cammmmot reject
time hypothesis that forecasters efficiently used the in-
formationcontained in past chammges iii themoney stock
in forming their predictions.
We mmext test the efficiency hypothesis for the pre-
ammd post-October 1979 periods; timese emnpiricalresults
also are found in table 2. 1mm both instances, we again
cannot reject the hypothesis that past information
about weekly money changes was used efficiently.
Neither F-statistic is significammt at the 5 percent level,
Based on these results, therefore, the weak-formeffi-
ciency hypothesis is not rejected by the data, regard-
less ofthe sample used.
m
7
Sec, Donald J. Mullineaux, “Omi Testing for Rationality: Another
Lookatthe Livingston Price Expectatiomms Data, “Journal ofPout-
icalEconomny(April 1978), pp 329—36for a discnssiomm ofthis test,
Tests of Stronger-Form Efficiency
The above evidence suggests that forecasts ofweekly
money stock changes are weakly efficient. Efficiency,
however, also may be considered in a broader sense.
Thisbroader efficiencycriterion requires that forecasts
incorporate all of the relev~mtand available informa-
tion. Thus, similar to the previoushypothesis, efficien-
cy in the broad sense reqmmires that the forecast errors
be orthogonal, or systematically unrelated to all rele-
vant available information sets.










where l~_~ refers to lagged values (i = 0, 1,..., n) of
information that are not incorporated in past money
stock changes, and w1 is another randonm error term.
The analysis is intended to determine whether the
survey respondent’s weekly errors in forecasting
money supplychanges canbe explained by some set(s)
of information that are readily available. If the esti-
Table 2
Test Results for Weak-Form Efficiency
4
Equation Estimated: ..XM~— ~ = b0 + ~ b1XM~.1÷ th1
i=1
Estmrraled r:oeftm( mem’ls b.irnia’y stal’sI’cs
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‘978 10 October 3 1979 -. 245 dud Oclober 10 1979 m Jure ‘6 1982 - 244
msTests usimig thisstronger formofefficiencyare pm’esentedin Cross-
man, “The ‘Rationality’ of Money Supply Expectations,” and,
Imsing interest rate expectations data, in Benjamin M, Friedman.
“Survey Evidemmee on time ‘Rationality’ ofInterest Rate Expecta-
tions,“Journal ofPmionetary Economnic.s (October 1980), pp. 453—
65, where the phrase “information orthogonality” was coined.
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Table 3
Test Resutts for Stronger-Form Efficiency
n
Equation Estimated: .SM1
— ~.. -~.XM~ = c0 + ~. c1 ‘t.i + w1
i=O
consumer ard mndustrma
loans 365’ 1 74 2.94
Demano depos’ls al marae
weercmy ‘eportmng barns 425 0.51 357’
F’oat 060 055 061
Adjustea base 329’ 055 365
- Smgnitmcantatthe Spercenl leve ot contmdence, The re evant crmlmcal F-values are January 11. 1978. toJune 16, 1982 —- 2.26. January 11.
1978. to October 3, 1979 -- .232, and Octooer 10. 1979 Ia June 16, 1982 ‘- 2 28.
mated cm coefficients are not significantlydifferentfrom
zero as a group, then we cannot reject the stronger-
form hypothesis of efficiency. If contrary evidence is
found, then the results would suggest that forecasters
could have reduced their prediction errors by using
the information sets investigated here.
It is, ofcourse, impossible toaccount forevery imag-
inable information set that each forecaster could have
used. Consequently, we analyze several sets of in-
formation that are available on a timely basis and are
potentially useful in estimating future money stock
developments. The informmmation sets usedare consum-
er and industrial loans, demanddeposits at largeweek-
ly reporting banks, float and the adjusted monetary
base as defined by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. In all cases, the data used are taken from origi-
n-al Federal Reserve statistical releases that were avail-
able to forecasters prior to the weekly money stock
announcements. ~‘ Although we realize that the series
moAn data am-c imitermsoflevel ctmammges fromthe previousweek. Data
sources are the Federal Reserve H4. 1 and H4,2 statistical re-
leases, and the Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis,
Thisprocedure ma” imupartsomiie measnm’ement error since omily
the initially released data are used, Civen the short time horizomi
used and the observation that the weekly data m’evisions arc mmot
severe, the approach used seemns sufficient. It also slmouid be
notedthat, since February 1980, data on cormsunmeramid indimstrial
ioamis and demand deposits atweekly reporting hammks have been
released comacurrently with the money supply numbers, Thus,
these two series offer no prior informatiomm durirmg the post-
chosen do not exhaust the set ofpossible information
sources, they are sufficiently broad to test the hypoth-
esis at hand.
Table 3 reports the calculated F-statistics from
estimating equation 6 using the different informatiorm
sets. In each test, the information set contains contemmm-
poraneous and four lagged terms. The outcome for the
fullperiod suggests that forecasters efficiently utilized
the infornmation contained in the float information set:
the reported F-statistic isnot largeenoughto reject the
null hypothesis. The results for the other information
sets — consumer and industrial loans, demand de-
posits at largeweeklyreporting banks andthe adjusted
base — reject the efficiency hypothesis.For these, the
F-statistics exceed the 5 percent critical value (2.26),
implying that forecast errorscould have beenlessened
if the information contained in these data had been
used.
Equation 6 was re-estimated for the pre- and post-
October 1979 periods; these results also are found in
table 3. The full-period results are dominated by time
post-October 1979 period. Prior to the shift in control
procedures, forecasters’ predictions of weekly m’noney
supply changes appear to have efficientlyincorporated
the information sets tested here: all the F-statistics are
less than the 5 percemmtcritical vahme (2.32). In contrast,
February 1980 pcm-iod. Tlmey do, however. provide niore imifbrmna—
tion that fom-ecasters may’ use in gemmerating theirexpected mmioney
nmmmiibers,
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the post-October 1979 results reveal that, except for
float, the forecasters could have immmproved upon their
ability to predict changes in the money stock by incor-
porating the information contained in the series on
loans, demand deposits and the adjusted base. Thus,
over the recent period, the forecasts do not meet the
broader efficiency criterion tested here.
CONe! USION
Previous examinations of survey data on weekly
money supply forecasts have focused primarily on the
effects of unanticipated money changes on market in-
terest rates. Although several studies have examined
the forecasts’ rationality, there has been no systematic
investigation into the effect ofthe change in monetary
control procedures on the unbiased and efficiency
characteristics of the forecasts.
The evidence presented here indicates that the
change in control procedures has had a significant
effect on the characteristics of weekly money supply
forecasts. Prior to October 1979, the forecasts of the
change in the weekly money stock were unbiased and
efficient. In contrast, weekly money forecasts since
October 1979 have been biased and inefficient.
The results ofthis investigation lend support to the
recently suggested hypothesis that, since October
1979, “market participants [have] concluded that the
rules under which monetary policy is conducted could
no longer be considered constant.”2°If this indeed is
true, then the combined evidence from this studyand
those dealing with the interest rate effects ofunantici-
pated money supply changes suggests that a more
predictable control procedure would contribute to a
more stable financial market.
20Cormmell, “Money Supply Announcements,” p. 22,
32